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A. INTRODUCTION  
Familiarity and functionality are factors that influence many consumers’ 
purchasing decisions with regard to computers and software.  An often-overlooked factor 
is the information assurance (IA) capabilities of these.  These IA factors can assist in 
creating, for individuals familiar with information assurance issues, a perceived security 
picture of a system or device.  This thesis will discuss the Windows CE (WinCE) 
operating system, known as the Pocket PC operating system (OS). 
Pocket PC is the third generation of the WinCE operating system.  Pocket PC 
executes on Compaq’s iPAQ, HP’s Jornada, Casio, and Symbol [OWS3j].  Merlin is the 
next operating system release scheduled for Pocket PCs; Merlin is based on WinCE 3.0. 
[NGS1b]  Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) that execute WinCE offer the Windows 
familiar look and feel, which may account for the device’s popularity among 
professionals [OWS3l].  Pocket PCs offer many familiar Windows applications, such as:  
Word, Excel, File Explorer, etc.  For individuals who are used to the Windows 
environment, Pocket PC will appear to be a miniature version of their desktop or laptop. 
Windows CE may also appeal to people who like to stay current with new 
technology and maximum functionality.  Windows CE is the only operating system 
executing on a PDA that will integrate with Microsoft’s .NET initiative, which will be 
discussed in Chapter V [MWS2l].  In comparison with the Palm operating system (the 
leading OS in the palm-size device market [OWS3l]), WinCE can multitask, provide a 
robust multimedia capability and supports software emulators for the Nintendo 
Entertainment System (NES) and Game Boy, Commodore 64, Sega, and others.  
Windows CE’s handwriting recognition system has enhanced handwriting recognition 
accuracy on the PDA. [OWS3j]  This Windows CE functionality may also help account 
for its popularity in the professional and corporate marketplace. 
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No matter how popular a device, operating system, or technology in general, 
becomes in the marketplace, for the security conscious, it is the information assurance 
capabilities of the device that may be most appealing.  For many, information assurance 
may not mean anything, but when IA is equated to privacy and protection of information, 
its necessity becomes clear [OWS3m].  There have been numerous exploits against 
PDAs, specifically the Palm OS [KIN01].  Before discussing some of the exploits, it is 
important to note that in this work, the assumption is made that these exploits have been 
targeted against the Palm OS because it is the most common PDA operating system.  
However, a lack of exploits should not lead to a false sense of security with regard to 
WinCE. 
B. PDA VULNERABILITIES 
In August of 2000, the first Palm Pilot Trojan Horse, which attacks Palm 
operating systems, was identified.  The importance of the event was not the Trojan Horse 
itself, but the possibilities and realization that malicious code could be written that would 
be harmful to Palms.  The implication of this is serious.  It now means that the move to 
wireless and developing Internet appliances that interact with everything from cars to 
refrigerators are susceptible to viruses and Trojan Horses. [OWS3m] 
Personal Digital Assistants software vulnerabilities (exploits) are not only limited 
to the PDA’s.  In February 2001, an exploit against passwords on the Palm Desktop 
Version 4 was published [NGS1a].  This exploit is mentioned so that the reader can 
understand that information assurance must provide protection of the information on the 
local system (PDA), in the synchronization protocols, and at the desktop.  Even if PDA 
operating systems are enhanced to provide security, the host system that it is partnered 
with for synchronization of databases must provide adequate security to ensure that the 
information is protected.  However, the scope of this thesis is on the WinCE operating 
system rather than the desktop services provided for the PDA. 
C. PDA SECURITY 
Developers of the Palm OS and Pocket PC OS have installed a password 
protection option [OWS3d].  However, security must be implemented at every level of 
the device, i.e. for the applications and the operating system, if the device is ever to be 
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recognized as a secure system.  The goal of this work is to enhance the security of the 
WinCE operating system.  This work is part of an incremental approach to enhancing 
WinCE security to make it a viable option for use in various environments within the 
military as well as the corporate workplace.  Chapters II through V describe this work. 
Each chapter is summarized below. 
1. Chapter II (Windows NT/UNIX) 
Chapter II discusses the two most popular desktop operating systems in use today, 
Windows NT and UNIX (LINUX is a flavor of UNIX).  This chapter provides the reader 
with an understanding of the threads and processes in WINNT and UNIX.  It also 
provides an overview of the WINNT authentication mechanism.  Windows NT, which 
can be configured to achieve a satisfactory security posture (see Chapter II, Section F), 
provides a useful example [SOL98].  This background is provided to give the reader an 
understanding of the thread and process model (WINNT) used for the WinCE thread and 
process data structures. 
2. Chapter III (WinCE) 
Chapter III discusses Windows CE processes and threads.  This chapter details the 
creation and termination of WinCE processes and threads.  In particular, the reader 
should take note of security attributes inherit to both the process and thread data 
structures.  Talisker, the next generation of the WinCE operating system, is discussed 
along with some of its improvements.  Talisker’s improvements include new modules 
that can be used to enhance security of an operating system image on a device. 
3. Chapter IV (Authentication) 
This chapter introduces authentication.  Authentication is defined as a way to 
confirm the identity of the client or server in the communication process.  Several 
authentication protocols are discussed in this chapter including: Kerberos and the 
Department of Defense’s Public Key Infrastructure (DoD PKI).  An overview of both 
protocols is provided. 
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4. Chapter V (Emerging Technology) 
This chapter discusses the research and development of new technology.  
Specifically discussed are processor research and development and the impact it may 
have on the future of technology.  The primary focus of this chapter is on Microsoft’s 
.NET initiative.  The objective is to help the reader understand the significance of WinCE 
as it relates the .NET initiative and palm-sized devices. 
5. Chapter VI (Conclusion and Recommendations) 
This chapter concludes the thesis.  This chapter also analyzes the information 
presented in the first five chapters and lists recommendations for further research.  This 
chapter summarizes the thesis and lists follow-on questions that may require additional 
research.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides the reader with a basic understanding of why security is 
important in operating systems.  It also reveals similarities between the WINNT and 
WinCE process and thread data structures and attributes.  This background information 
gives context to providing security enhancements, such as authentication, to WinCE.  
However, before delving into security, a brief overview of operating systems is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Computers have become an integral part of everyday life for many people.  They 
are pervasive in government, the military, in many industries and in many institutions 
ranging from educational to religious.  More and more people are acquiring personal 
computers for personal and business use.  They continue to enhance areas of our lives as 
never before – so much so that superficial and real dependencies have developed.  
Computers are widespread and unavoidable; they are a part of our lives whether we know 
it or not. 
Computers are applied to so many aspects of our lives today that our recent past – 
before our daily exposure to computers – seems like ancient history.  For example, 
consider how we banked twenty-five years ago.  To have some money (cash) for the 
weekend, the customer had to go to the bank on Friday before the bank closed and 
interact with a teller to access his or her money.  Consider banking today: money is 
accessed from the nearest automated teller machine (provided there are adequate funds 
available).  But even more recently, consider how five years ago how we kept track of 
important events that we either needed to attend or plan.  We used bulky planners with 
calendars and memos.  Today, many people use Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). 
In the April 2001 issue of PC World magazine [OWS3b], one consumer 
acknowledges using his PDA for work, leisure, and dating.  The article goes on to 
describe how the consumer uses his IPaq (a palm-sized device made by Compaq running 
the Windows CE operating system) to take notes during company meetings, to catch up 
on his email messages while lying in bed, and to plug in his headphones to listen to MP3s 
at the gym.  In the same article another consumer expressed his appreciation for this 
Handspring Visor Deluxe, a PDA based on the Palm operating system.  With more and 
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more professionals and consumers using PDAs, the Gartner Group estimates sales in the 
United States over the next four years to hit 28 million, an increase of 300% [OWS3b]. 
Although PDAs may not equal or exceed the number of desktop computers in the 
market place for some years to come, the two main electronic organizer operating 
systems (Palm OS and Windows CE OS) are quickly heading for a showdown [OWS3c].  
This fierce competition is resulting in consumers reaping many benefits.  Benefits from 
the Pocket PCs are: bright 240x320 screens, fast StrongARM processors, and familiar 
Windows-like interfaces; while Palm PDAs are delivering better streamlined operations 
and longer battery life (Palm has a different battery model than Pocket PC) [OWS3c].  As 
these two products continue to compete, consumers will soon realize the strengths of both 
products in one PDA, and analysts estimate this will bring near equilibrium to the 
marketplace by 2004 with Windows CE taking 40% of the market share while Palm takes 
45% [OWS3c].  PDAs have become so popular that users can even purchase insurance 
for them [OWS3d]. 
Insurance on a PDA may provide the owner of the PDA with some comfort in 
situations involving the loss of the PDA due to theft or in some cases even negligence on 
the part of the owner (loss of PDA in the airport), but it cannot provide the owner with 
any guarantee of data recovery.  With insurance, the owner has a reasonably high 
probability that the PDA will be replaced; however, the owner has no possibility of 
recovering or replacing the data, provided the data was not backed-up elsewhere.  Also 
data can be lost without the loss of the PDA.   Malicious software, worms, and viruses 
can corrupt or contaminate data beyond repair.  Insurance can do little for lost data.  One 
of the best ways to try to mitigate such threats is to harden or secure the critical data 
management software and the operating system. 
The WinCE-based architecture includes data management components such as: 
object store (file system), drivers, shells, etc., all of which either manipulate data directly 
or indirectly, or manipulate objects that in turn manipulate data.  WinCE-based 
applications are layered on top of the architecture.  The software components within the 
architecture actually provide the information necessary to run the application, store the 
data from the applications, or provide data to the applications, it is important to secure 
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these objects (components).  If the architecture is insecure, but the applications are 
secure, there is no reliable mechanism beneath the application level to insure the 
protection of the information; therefore, the system is not secure. 
Any components that have access to data or a dependency relationship with 
another component or application that has access to data must be secured to begin to 
achieve system security.  However, system security does not end with securing the 
components.  The components, data, applications, etc. are managed by the operating 
system.  Thus it is most critical to secure the operating system so that application 
developers can be protected against certain security threats. 
The goal of this chapter is to review the basic definition of an operating system 
and its function, and to familiarize the reader with the concepts, data structure and life 
cycle of OS support for processes and threads.  Of course, there are many more parts to 
an OS, but this work will focus on processes, threads, and authentication.  Keep in mind 
that part of our goal is to analyze the processes and threads in the context of the 
Microsoft CE OS and determine how, if possible, to enhance CE to make it a more self-
protecting OS.  The process and thread modules encompass the life cycle of the processes 
and threads from their creation to their termination and their access to critical 
components and protected domains.  Thus the focus of this chapter will be an overview of 
operating systems, with particular emphasis on processes and threads. 
 There are four general types of operating systems: real-time OSs (RTOS); single-
user, single task OSs; single-user, multi-tasking OSs; and multi-user OSs [OWSa].  A 
brief description of OSs will be presented.  A general comparison of a process’s data 
structures and life cycle within the two most popular (personal) commercial OS platforms 
on the market today, the Microsoft Windows NT-based OS (proprietary code) and the 
Linux OS (open source code based on UNIX), will also be presented.  Although 
processes and threads will be reviewed for both the Unix platform and Windows 
platform, the Windows platform will be the basis for exploration into the Windows CE 
process and thread modules (Chapter III). 
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B. OPERATING SYSTEM BACKGROUND 
It is crucial to understand the operating system mechanism in order to fully 
comprehend and appreciate the role of processes and threads.  Typically, OSs share a 
common goal of supporting the following types of system components [SIL94]: 
• Process management, 
• Main-memory management, 
• Secondary-storage management, 
• I/O system management, 
• File management, 
• Protection system, 
• Networking, and 
• Command-interpreter system 
Operating systems are not limited to only supporting or managing the above listed 
components.  However, to provide a basis for what components define an OS, the above 
list is sufficient for this paper.  For a more in-depth understanding of the supported 
components of an OS, refer to any introductory book on operating systems, for example: 
[SIL98], [STA98], or [TAN97].  Also, understanding what components define an OS 
enables us to intuitively appreciate the purpose of an operating system. 
 An operating system is a mechanism or program that simplifies the management 
of resources (components) to execute application programs.  The OS’s role in managing 
resources is what makes securing it difficult.  The OS must be robust and flexible enough 
to support new components as they are introduced into the market.  If security on the OS 
makes it too inflexible, it may not appeal to enough people to survive its competition.   
The OS also acts as an intermediary between the user of a computer and the 
computer hardware.  Stallings [STA98] defines an OS as a mechanism that 
exploits the hardware resources of one or more processors to provide a set 
of services to system users. 
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  Operating systems vary in purpose and design as our use of technology and 
resources varies, as illustrated by our migration from multi-user, multi-tasking systems to 
single-user, multi-tasking systems.  We have defined the OS at a high level of 
abstraction.  This level of abstraction is both sufficient and convenient for the purpose of 
discussing processes and threads. 
 Processes and threads may vary slightly in meaning depending on the particular 
OS (platform) implementation; however, their roles remain consistent irrespective of the 
OS.  The following sections will discuss processes and threads in general terms and as 
they each relate to the Unix and Windows OS platforms.  If processes and threads differ 
in definition or roles between the two systems, those differences will be discussed.  This 
approach will provide a greater understanding of processes and threads from a broad 
perspective while allowing for a detailed analysis of their roles and meanings within, 
arguably, the two dominant platforms used today. 
C. PROCESSES 
Processes and threads are necessary to the OS, in part, because the OS utilizes 
both as a means of executing programs.  Threads will be covered later in Section D of 
this chapter.  This section will focus on processes.  The term process has been given 
many different definitions.  Generically, many operating system books will define a 
process as a program in execution, or an entity that can be assigned to and executed on a 
processor.  One book defines it as the “animated spirit” of a program [STA98].  In the 
Windows NT OS (WINNT), a process is defined as a set of resources reserved for the 
threads to execute a program [SOL98].  The Unix OS defines a process as an instance of 
a program in execution [BAC86]. 
The myriad of definitions may seem to add ambiguity to the term process, but the 
definitions are not in conflict with one another.  Just the opposite is true; the definitions 
support and enhance one another.  A process is an entity that can be assigned to and 
executed on a processor.  Moreover, a process is also an entity that reserves resources so 
that it can use those resources to execute a program.  And lastly, a process is an instance 
of a program (this definition will prove to be useful in the discussion of swapping and the 
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“context of a process”).  As can be seen, the role of a process is given in its definition – 
an entity that reserves system resources for the execution of a program.   
A process is not a program (application).  A program is a static sequence of 
instructions (text).  Programs and processes are synergistic.  The program needs the 
process in order to execute; the process needs the program in order to have purpose.  It is 
sometimes easy to confuse the two because of their dependency.  We further distinguish 
the two by defining a program as a passive entity and a process as an active entity.  A 
process generally includes the current activity (program counter), contents of the 
processor’s registers, process stack, data section containing global variables, and the text 
(the program) [SIL94].  The aforementioned description of a process is known as its data 
structure.   
1. Process Data Structure 
In general a process will have at a minimum a program or set of programs to 
execute, a set of data locations for local and global variables and all defined constants, a 
stack that is used to keep track of procedure calls and parameter passing between 
procedures, and a number of attributes that allow the OS to control the process [STA98].  
The physical manifestation of a process or its data structure will depend on the platform.   
First consider WINNT; the process in WINNT is known as the executive process 
(EPROCESS) [SOL98].  The EPROCESS block, Figure 2.1, contains attributes about the 
process as well as pointers to other data structures.  
Two key data structures in the EPROCESS are the kernel process (KPROCESS) 
and the process environment block (PEB).  The KPROCESS block is sometimes referred 
to as the process control block (PCB).  The PCB contains information that the kernel 
needs to schedule threads.  In WINNT the EPROCESS and KPROCESS both reside in 
system address space and the PEB resides in user address space.  Access to system space, 
also known as kernel space, requires privilege.  User space is accessible by non-
privileged entities.  The PEB contains the information needed to load the image loader, 
the heap manager and all Win32 DLLs that need to be modified from user mode.   
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Figure 2.1 WINNT EPROCESS Block (After: [SOL98]) 
The image loader, heap manager and Win32 DLLs are user-level entities that the 
operating system uses to create and manage processes.  During CreateProcess, a function 
call, the image loader determines the type of file associated with the request to run.  Once 
the file type has been determined, the image loader loads the appropriate image for that 
file (notifies the appropriate subsystem of the new process); for example, appropriate 
images for Win32 processes are Posix.exe for POSIX file types and Ntvdm.exe for MS-
DOS, .exe, .com, and .pif file types [SOL00].  If the file does not have an appropriate 
image, CreateProcess fails [SOL00].  The heap manager is a set of functions that controls 
the amount of memory allocated and deallocated [SOL00].  The Win32 DLLs are a set of 
callable subroutines in a binary file that are linked together and can be dynamically 
loaded by applications that use the subroutines [SOL00]. 
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The UNIX process structure is now described.  Figure 2.2 shows a Unix-based 
process’s data structure.  The kernel process table -- depicted in the figure as process 
table -- has an entry for each process.  The “u area” contains the process’s private data 
that can only be manipulated by the kernel and only when the specific process is 
executing.  The process table contains pointers to the per process region table.  The 
entries in the per process region table point to entries in the region table.  A region is 
defined as a contiguous area of a process’s address space.  The region table entries 
describes the attributes of the region, such as whether it contains text or data, whether it is 
shared or private, and where the “data” of the region is located in memory [BAC86].   
 
Figure 2.2 Unix Process Data Structure (From: [BAC86]) 
The data structure of a process, although it may be platform dependent in terms of 
its physical implementation, must meet the minimum requirements mentioned above: a 
program to execute, location of local and global variables, etc.  This paper will not map 
the minimum requirements to each of the data structures; however, the reader should note 
that each data structure does implement and support the requirements.  Each process 
managed by the OS has its own data structure independent of any other process managed 
by the OS.  However, processes may share certain information and at times memory. This 
will be discussed further in Section F Subsection 1 of this chapter.  Processes operate 
independently of one another and usually do not share memory, which is useful when the 
tasks to be performed are unrelated [SIL94].   
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2. Process Life Cycle 
Another important aspect of a process is its life cycle.  Processes make it possible 
for multi-tasking OSs running on a single processor to multi-task and make the computer 
appear to process multiple applications simultaneously.  Processes primarily accomplish 
this through life cycle transitions and time allocation from the OS.  There are several 
stages in the life cycle of a process.  A complete process state transition diagram is 
depicted in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 Process Life Cycle (From: [BAC86]) 
Figure 2.3 shows the transition state diagram for processes in a Unix-based OS.  
However, every process, regardless of the OS that supports it, can be represented in part 
or in full by the figure.  Not every OS’s supported processes will have the full array of 
transition states as shown in Figure 2.3.  As a general rule, a process will always have one 
of the following states:  new/created, running, waiting, ready, or terminated.  Each 
transition state is defined as follows [BAC86, STA98]: 
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User running:  the process is executing in user mode. 
Kernel running:  the process is executing in kernel mode. 
Ready to run in memory:  the process is not executing but is ready to run as 
soon as the kernel schedules it. 
Asleep in memory:  the process is sleeping and resides in main memory. 
Ready to run, swapped:  the process is ready to run, but the swapper (process 0) 
must swap the process into main memory before the kernel can schedule it to 
execute (although some [BAC86, STA98] refer to process 0 as a swapper, it may 
be more precise to think of it as a transitional mechanism that transitions a process 
from the User running state to Ready to run in memory, the process remains in 
main memory throughout the transition). 
Sleep, swapped:  the process is sleeping, and the swapper (swapper here refers to 
a mechanism that actually moves the process from main memory to secondary 
memory) has swapped the process to secondary storage to make room for other 
processes in main memory. 
Preempted:  the process is returning from kernel to user mode, but the kernel 
preempts it and does a context switch to schedule another process.  The 
distinction between this state and the state “ready to run in memory” is based on 
the process.  In this state a process running in kernel mode can be preempted only 
when it is about to return to user mode.  Otherwise, the preempted state is the 
same as “ready to run in memory.” 
Fork:  the process is newly created and is in the transition state; the process 
exists, but it is not ready to run, nor is it sleeping.  This state is the start state for 
all processes except process 0. 
Zombie:  the process executed the exit system call and is in the zombie state.  The 
process no longer exists, but it leaves a record containing an exit code and some 
timing statistics for its parent process to collect.  The zombie state is the final state 
of the process.   
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There are several triggers that cause a process to transition from one state to 
another.  One of the major triggers is central processing unit (CPU) time.  How much 
CPU time the OS allocates to a process is important to the process.  The time that is 
allocated to a process is known as a quantum.  In a single-user, single task OS, processes 
execute sequentially, and once the process begins, it runs until it ends.  In the single-user, 
single task system, the process has complete control of the CPU and resources until it has 
accomplished its task – the current process monopolizes the CPU until it completes its 
task.  The user cannot move between various programs or open multiple windows.   
In a single-user, multi-tasking operating system (common in most desktop 
operating systems today), processes must share the processor(s) and resources in 
accordance with a scheduling algorithm.  Once a process is scheduled, it is given a 
quantum, in which it has exclusive use of the CPU and any unlocked resources.  After the 
process’s quantum expires, the OS, in accordance with its scheduling algorithm, gives the 
CPU and access to all unlocked resources to another process.   
A multi-user, multi-tasking operating system, such as UNIX System V, sets up a 
computing environment for a user’s process [STA98].  The multi-user OS must separate 
one user’s resources from another’s.  Each user process has exclusive use of the CPU for 
a specified period of time, much like a quantum [STA98]. This method allows the OS to 
appear to execute application programs simultaneously, while the quantum and 
scheduling algorithm prevents processes from monopolizing the CPU, thereby preventing 
starvation or other detrimental situations for the OS. 
3. Process Switching and Process Context 
The method that allows the CPU in multi-tasking operating systems to move from 
one process to another in accordance with a scheduling algorithm is known as process 
swapping and sometimes it is referred to as process switching.  A process must be in 
main memory to be executed.  As mentioned earlier, to avoid starvation because one 
process controls or monopolizes the CPU, each process is given a quantum of time to 
have exclusive use of the CPU.  Once the process’s quantum expires, the process is 
removed from execution and another process is scheduled for execution.   
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  Depending on the design of the operating system, there may be additional 
events, besides the expiration of the process’s quantum that could cause processes to 
transition from the running state.  Some of the more general events that are usually 
common to most OSs are preemption, which can be caused by process priority (one 
process having a higher priority than another), I/O operations, and traps (traps are for 
mode switching, not process switching, but a snap shot of the state of the machine 
(process or thread context) must be maintained during a trap [SOL98]).  A process with a 
higher priority may preempt a lower priority process; note that many operating systems 
have a mechanism in place to ensure that low priority processes are not starved.  I/O 
operations could cause a process to wait.  In such cases, to optimize CPU usage, the 
process that is waiting on the I/O operation might transition from the running state.   
A trap is a term that is used to explain a processor’s mechanism for capturing an 
executing process or thread when an exception or an interrupt occurs which requires a 
snapshot of the process’s context [SOL98]; the process’s context is its registers, stack 
information, and other pertinent information, which needs to be preserved when the 
system mode is switching from user mode to kernel mode.  The cause of a trap is usually 
associated with the execution of the current instruction [STA98].  Usually a trap is used 
to handle an error or an exceptional condition [STA98]. 
During process transitions the operating system must save the state and pertinent 
information of the currently executing process.  The state and pertinent information of a 
process is the process context.  In general (expanding the definition of the process 
context), it usually consists of the program counter, other process registers, and stack 
information from both user and kernel space (remember that a process has data, text, and 
a stack – the earlier definition of a process being an instance of a program corresponds 
with the “text” portion of the process).  By freezing the process and capturing a snapshot 
of it as it exists in its halted or frozen state, the OS is able to move it from executing 
memory to storage and is later able to move it back into executing memory with its 
precise settings when it was frozen or halted.  The OS prevents arbitrary process 
swapping and transitions thereby maintaining consistency. 
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In Unix-based operating systems, all processes except process 0 are spawned from 
other processes through the fork system call.  Process 0 is created when the operating 
system boots up.  Process 0 spawns process 1, which is known as init.  The init process is 
the ancestor of every other process in the Unix system.  A parent process is any process 
that spawns another process through the fork system call.  The spawned process is known 
as the child process.  Process 0 becomes the transitional mechanism.  Both Unix-based 
OSs and NT-based OSs use a scheduling algorithm that schedules processes.  However, 
WinCE, which is an NT-based OS, schedules threads.  Threads will be discussed in the 
next section.  
Each application (program) executing is assigned only one process by the 
operating system, the parent process.  If other processes are required to assist the parent 
process in reserving resources to enable the program to execute, the additional processes 
are spawned by the parent process and not the operating system; however, each process is 
considered a separate execution sequence [SIL94].  For example, several users may be 
running copies of a mail program [SIL94]; in this example each user is assigned a parent 
process that works on their behalf and each mail program is a child process to a unique 
parent process, a one-to-one correspondence.   In a similar example, a single user may 
invoke many copies of an editor program [SIL94].  In this example, each copy of the 
editor program is a child process to the same parent process, a one-to-many 
correspondence.  A process can spawn one or more processes (children/child processes) 
or threads to assist in executing a program. 
D. THREADS 
For systems that support threads, the OS is designed to schedule threads instead of 
processes for a quantum.  This is the case in Windows NT.  A thread is an entity spawned 
from a process that executes a program [SOL98].  More simply stated, a thread is a 
precisely measurable controlled unit of work (a basic unit of CPU utilization) [STA98].  
Threads enable resources (although threads do not reserve resources) to be shared and 
accessed concurrently within the same process, which is useful for related jobs.  A thread 
can be spawned from a process or another thread.  A thread can only spawn another 
thread -- a child thread.   Threads allow a more granular definition of the dependencies 
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between processes and programs by completing the synergism that exists between the 
process and program.  Many modern operating systems use processes and threads.  This 
research will focus on Windows CE, which is a processed-based, single-user OS that 
schedules threads instead of processes.   
Threads are very similar to processes.  However, threads are used to enhance the 
capability of a process’ multi-tasking ability.  Threads allow resources to be shared and 
accessed concurrently within the same process by executing in the same address space 
(domain) [SIL94].  Threads are sometimes called lightweight processes [SIL94].  Threads 
generally consist of a program counter, a register set, and a stack space [SIL94].  A 
thread, like a process, is assigned to run in user space or system space depending on its 
privilege. 
Threads operate similarly to processes in many regards in terms of their life cycle 
and context.  Threads will generally have one of several states similar to processes:  
new/create, ready, blocked, running or terminated.  Threads, unlike processes, are not 
independent of one another because they have to work together to share a pool of 
resources reserved for the process, whereas processes aren’t required to work together in 
the same manner because each process has its own pool of reserved resources and the 
underlying OS provides the management.   
Threads can be managed either at the application level or within the OS.  Threads 
within a process execute sequentially and each thread has its own stack and program 
counter.  Since Windows CE’s scheduling algorithm schedules threads, threads will be 
covered in more detail in Chapter III.   The Windows NT thread data structure will be 
discussed in detail in Section F Subsection 2 of this chapter.  In addition to having a 
general understanding of threads and processes, enhancement of an OSs self-protection 
capability requires an understanding of security. 
E. SECURITY 
Security, which is usually thought of as privacy and protection, is often used in 
connection with information-storing systems.  Security describes techniques that control 
access to use of or modification of a computer or the information contained in it.  It is 
often useful to categorize security violations in three categories:  unauthorized 
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information release, unauthorized information modification and unauthorized use 
[SAL75].  Chapter IV will take a closer look at security and how it can be applied to 
Windows CE, specifically in the case of authentication. 
Security is based on three notions [MUL93]:  authentication, access control and 
auditing.  Authentication requires that for every request for an operation, the name of the 
requestor must be known reliably.  The source of the request is called a principal.  Access 
control requires that for every resource and every operation on that resource, it is possible 
to specify the names of the principles allowed to perform that operation on that resource.  
Every request for an operation is checked to ensure that the principal is allowed to 
perform that operation.  Auditing permits every access to a resource to be logged if 
desired, and can be evidence used to authenticate every request.  If a troubling situation 
occurs, there is a record of exactly what happened. 
There are two ways to approach security.  One approach involves constructing a 
formal specification for the desired security properties (and other properties) of a system 
then designing and implementing the OS.  The other way is to find, catalog and repair 
security flaws in existing systems.  This project will encompass both approaches.  
Security has its own terminology and it is broad.  Scoping the security discussion and 
understanding the terminology make identifying and cataloging security flaws in the 
Windows CE authentication mechanism easier. 
The scope of the security discussion for this paper is the authentication 
mechanism, modes of operation, and mechanisms that are common to processes.  
Windows CE operates in one of two modes: user mode or kernel mode.  A mechanism is 
common to two processes if it uses some set of data items whose value one process can 
influence and the other can notice.  Common mechanisms carry a built-in risk – they 
make it possible for the process of one user to exert unauthorized influence over the 
process or data of another.  Malicious users can exploit flaws in common mechanisms to 
work their will. 
According to Michael Schroeder [SCH75], the operating systems of shared 
general-purpose computers have a well-known tendency to be extraordinarily large and 
complex.  This size and complexity interacts badly with the negative nature of security 
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requirements.  It generates many possible ways to perform unauthorized actions, some of 
which will go unnoticed by system designers.  This increases the probability of 
exploitable errors in the implementation of the provided protection mechanisms.  
Examining the thread and process module of Windows NT will provide a basic 
understanding of the OS.  Although the WINNT OS is substantially larger, with respect 
to lines of code than the Windows CE OS, WINNT affords some insight into the 
Windows-based platform.  Windows CE, on the other hand, is a smaller system, and 
lacks many of the security features of Windows NT.  Because WinCE lacks many of the 
security features found in WINNT, WinCE is more vulnerable.  However, WinCE’s lack 
of security features and increased modularity gives it the advantage of being less complex 
than WINNT, which naturally adheres to the design principle of economy of mechanism 
[SAL75]. 
Many systems try to reduce the probability of exploitable errors through good 
software engineering by utilizing well-established design principles to construct the 
internal mechanisms.  These principles, when properly used, help to reduce design and 
implementation flaws, which might otherwise exist and provide paths by which the 
protection mechanisms in the system could be circumvented.  Good engineering also 
utilizes established concepts such as the security kernel and reference monitor [AND72].  
A security kernel is a minimal, protected core of software whose correct operation is 
sufficient to guarantee enforcement of the claimed constraints on access and is the 
structural basis for organizing a secure system [SCH75]. 
Although the goal is not to make Windows CE a high assurance secure system, it 
is prudent to maximize usage of the ideas and principles that govern secure systems.  For 
example, while studying the design of a system, it is noticed that a mechanism in a more 
protected level of the OS depends on a function from a less protected or higher level of 
abstraction for the correctness of its operation.  This is considered an upward dependency 
and a serious flaw in the system’s design [GOL79].  It is also crucial to look at ways to 
implement security once a security policy has been established for the system.   
Our goal in enhancing the Windows CE security is to balance security with 
performance.  Since security by its very definition is an increase in system functionality, 
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i.e., the system’s ability to a certain degree to protect itself and its information, 
performance will be adversely affected.  Since Windows CE is a smaller OS on a small 
platform, it will have very limited space in which to implement security.  Because 
WinCE has a more limited space to implement security than larger operating systems, the 
choice of which security features to implement is vital.  If security is to work properly, 
care must be given when deciding what security features are required and what security 
mechanisms will be used to achieve the requirement.  Security should be meticulously 
designed and carefully implemented. 
For a particular mechanism or functionality, there may be a number of 
satisfactory implementations.  Security implementations are described in terms of 
security concepts and mechanisms, such as: reference monitor, security kernel, capability 
lists (capabilities), access control lists (ACLs), discretionary access control (DAC), 
mandatory access control (MAC), domains, rings, and a host of additional concepts and 
mechanisms, too numerous to list.  Not only do these concepts and mechanisms describe 
the type of security implemented, they also define the granularity of the security; for 
example, security can control authorized access at various levels such as: the entire 
system, directories, files, data within a files, compartments, etc.  Another important 
aspect of security is knowing “who or what” has gained or is trying to gain access to the 
data, which is accomplished through the operating system [SAL75].  For authorized users 
of a system, this is normally accomplished through authentication.  How Windows NT 
implements authentication is discussed in the next section. 
F. WINDOWS NT AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM 
This section will focus on the Windows NT authentication mechanism.  However, 
since processes and threads are an integral part of the Windows NT OS and 
authentication mechanism, this section will discuss how processes and threads are created 
and how they communicate.  Fibers will also be mentioned.  These are a type of thread.  
In the discussion of the creation of processes and threads certain acronyms will be used. 
Such acronyms are standard in the OS literature and as much as possible this paper will 
try to minimize the use of unusual acronyms.   
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 1. Windows NT-based Process and Thread Creation 
Users as well as the OS manipulate processes through application programming 
interface (API) functions, but a process must first exist.  A new process is created 
whenever an application calls the Win32 CreateProcess function.  The creation of a 
Win32 process consists of several stages and involve three different parts of the OS:  the 
Win32 client-side library KERNEL32.DLL, the Windows NT executive, and the Win32 
subsystem process (CSRSS).  Figure 2.4 summarizes the Win32 create process. 
 
Figure 2.4 Process Creation (From: [SOL00]) 
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A process’s creation is complete as evidenced by the process environment having 
been determined, resources for its threads to use having been allocated, the process 
having a thread, and the Win32 subsystem having record of the new process.  The new 
thread begins life running the kernel mode startup routine KiThreadStartup [SOL98].  
KiThreadStartup performs thread-specific initialization, and then the actual thread routine 
specified by the caller of CreateThread is invoked [SOL98].  However, at this point, the 
thread has already been created, so the call to CreateThread is to notify the Win32 
subsystem about the new thread so that the subsystem can perform some setup work for 
the new thread. 
The initial thread’s creation is initialized and completed during the Win32 
CreateProcess call.  In the CreateProcess, the call to create a thread filters down to the 
Windows NT executive, where the process manager allocates space for the thread object 
and calls the kernel to initialize the kernel thread block.  At this point the Win32 
CreateThread is called.  The CreateThread creates a user-mode stack for the thread in the 
process’s address space.  CreateThread then initializes the thread’s hardware context (this 
is CPU-architecture specific).  The NtCreateThread is called to create the executive 
thread object in the suspended state.  At this point, the CreateThread notifies the Win32 
subsystem as mentioned earlier.  The thread handle and ID are returned to the caller and 
unless the thread was created with the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag set, the thread is 
resumed so it can be scheduled for execution.  Figure 2.5 summarizes the steps involved 
in thread creation. 
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Figure 2.5 Create Thread 
2. Windows NT Thread Data Structure 
The executive thread (ETHREAD) block represents the Windows NT OS thread.  
The ETHREAD block contains two other thread data structures, the kernel thread 
(KTHREAD), which contains the information that the Windows NT kernel needs to 
access to perform thread scheduling and synchronization on behalf of running threads and 
the thread environment block (TEB), which stores context information for the image 
loader and various Win32 DLLs.  The ETHREAD block and the structures it contains 
and points to exist in system space with the exception of the TEB, which exists in the 
process address space as shown in Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6 ETHREAD Block (After: [SOL98]) 
Although fibers are not a part of our research, it is important to understand fibers 
and their role in the Windows NT-based OS.  Fibers are a subset of threads and are 
contained in the thread object.  They are sometime referred to as “lightweight” threads.  
Fibers differ from threads in how they are scheduled.  Threads are allocated CPU time by 
the OS.  Fibers are not allocated CPU time by the OS; instead a programmer must 
manually schedule fibers to run.   Fibers will not run unless the thread they are contained 
in is scheduled to run.  Fiber scheduling is very simple: once the thread containing the 
fiber is scheduled to run, the fiber will run until it finishes or until it instructs the OS to 
run another fiber.  Fiber functions were added to the Win32 API set primarily to support 
porting server applications from UNIX that were designed to schedule their own threads 
rather than relying on a priority system [SOL98]. 
The Windows NT priority system consists of 32 priority levels for threads ranging 
from 0 through 31.  The range is divided into three groups.  The groupings are real-time 
levels, which range from 16 through 31; variable levels, which range from 1 through 15; 
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and system level, which is 0.  Threads are assigned a priority level from two different 
perspectives: the Win32 API and Windows NT kernel.  The Windows NT kernel assigns 
the thread priority based on one of the 32 levels already mentioned.  The Win32 API 
assignment involves the process’s assignment.  The Win32 API assigns each thread a 
priority based on a combination of the thread’s process priority class and the thread’s 
relative priority.  The Win32 API process priority classes are “real-time,” “high,” 
“normal,” and “idle.”   The Win32 thread’s relative priorities are “time-critical,” 
“highest,” “above-normal,” “normal,” “below-normal,” “lowest,” and “idle.”  Table 2.1 is 
a mapping of the kernel thread priorities to the Win32 API priorities.  
Every thread starts out with its priority equal to that of the process or thread that 
spawned it.  Each thread has two priority values, its base priority, which is the priority 
that it starts with and its current priority, which is the priority at which the thread is 
currently running.  A thread whose current priority is within the range 1 through 15 often 
has a lower base priority; however, a thread whose current priority is in the range 16 
through 31 never has its priority adjusted by the OS, so the base priority is always equal 
to the current priority. 
 
Table 2.1 Kernel Priority Levels (From: [SOL98]) 
Threads and processes are such an intricate part of the OS that they impact a 
system’s ability to provide security for itself.  Of specific interest is the WINNT 
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authentication mechanism.  The authentication mechanism is initiated and driven by a 
process, the logon process (WinLogon).  WINNT can be configured to F-C2/E3, which 
indicates more security than just an authentication mechanism, in accordance with the 
UK Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification (ITSEC) board 
[SOL98].  (Note that ITSEC has been replaced in some countries by the international 
standard - The Common Criteria [CCI99].)  Also, the U.S. Department of Defense 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) formally evaluated WINNT 3.51 
at the C2 level [SOL98].  However, this research focuses on one of the first steps in 
creating a security-enhanced CE OS, which is providing a small, reliable authentication 
mechanism.  
WINNT provides four basic security services [SOL98]:  a secure logon facility, 
discretionary access control, security auditing, and memory protection.  The secure logon 
facility requires users to identify and authenticate themselves by entering a unique logon 
identifier and password before they are allowed access to the system.  There are several 
components that makes this secure logon possible:  local security authority (LSA) server, 
security reference monitor (SRM), LSA policy database, security accounts manager 
(SAM) server, SAM database, default authentication package, and WinLogon.  Each one 
is described below [SOL98]. 
Local security authority (LSA) server: A user-mode process running the image 
LSASS.EXE that is responsible for the local system security policy (such as which users 
are allowed to log on to the machine, password policies, the list of privileges granted to 
users and groups, and the system security auditing settings), user authentication, and 
sending security audit messages to the Event Log. 
Security reference monitor (SRM): A component in the Windows NT executive 
(NTOSKRNL.EXE) that is responsible for performing security access checks on objects, 
manipulating privileges (user rights), and generating any resulting security audit 
messages. 
LSA policy database: A database that contains the system security policy 
settings. This database is stored in the registry under 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security.  It includes such information as what domains are 
27 
trusted to authenticate logon attempts, who has permission to access the system and how 
(interactive, network, and service logons), who is assigned which privileges, and what 
kind of security auditing is to be performed. 
Security accounts manager (SAM) server: A set of subroutines responsible for 
managing the database that contains the usernames and groups defined on the local 
machine or for a domain (if the system is a domain controller).  The SAM runs in the 
context of the LSASS process. 
SAM database: A database that contains the defined users and groups, along 
with their passwords and other attributes.  This database is stored in the registry under 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SAM. 
Default authentication package: A dynamic-link library (DLL) named 
MSV1_0.DLL that runs in the context of the LSASS process that implements Windows 
NT authentication.  This DLL is responsible for checking whether a given username and 
password match what is specified in the SAM database, and if they do, returning the 
information about that user. 
Logon process: A user-mode process running WINLOGON.EXE that is 
responsible for capturing the username and password, sending them to the LSA for 
verification, and creating the initial process in the user’s session.  
These components work together to provide logon authentication.  The security 
reference monitor (SRM) is the only component located in kernel space.  The LSA, 
which is in user space, is responsible for communicating with the SRM.  They 
communicate using local procedure calls (LPC).  The SRM creates a port 
(SeRmCommandPort), during system initialization.  The LSA connects to that port.  The 
LSA creates an LPC port (SeLsaCommandPort) when the LSA process starts.  The SRM 
connects to SeLsaCommandPort.  During system initialization, once the respective 
processes have connected to the other’s created port, the result is a private 
communication port and neither process listens on their respective connect port any 
longer.  Since the processes no longer listen to their respective port and the ports are 
unnamed, a subsequent user process cannot successfully connect to either port ( if the 
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entry points still exist after the initialization phase, they may be exploitable; however, 
this is difficult to determine without inspection of the SRM code). 
The WinLogon process is the only process that can intercept logon requests from 
the keyboard.  During system initialization, WinLogon is given control of the workstation 
once the system is ready for user interaction [SOL00].  WinLogon creates three desktops, 
an application desktop, a WinLogon desktop, and a screen saver desktop [SOL00].  Only 
WinLogon can access the WinLogon desktop making the WinLogon process a trusted 
process.  
If a user wants to access the system (legitimately), the user must go through the 
WinLogon desktop.  The WinLogon desktop will authenticate the user.   It communicates 
with the LSA, using an LPC, to authenticate the user.  Once the user has been 
authenticated, the user is given access to the application desktop and the screen saver 
desktop.  A concern with this logon model is its lack of simplicity; its GUI code required 
to logon is enormous in contrast to the XTS 300 logon interface, which is not ideal for 
users but simple.  The UI for the XTS300 is not user friendly nor is it an intuitive “point 
and click” interface.  It requires the user to understand the various sessions levels for 
logon and what privileges the user will have at the various levels.  It is simple because the 
code to present this interface can be minimized. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Processes are essential to computer usage, from system initialization, user 
authentication, to system shutdown.  Understanding the process’s requirements for 
system resources for program execution and how operating systems manage those 
resources gives us a better understanding of the importance of local (single desktop) 
computer security within a large network of computers.  As mentioned at the beginning 
of the chapter, computers are playing an increasingly larger role in our everyday lives.  In 
networks, a compromised process (compromised program that a process is executing) on 
a single computer could affect other computers in that network as well.  Understanding 
processes and their roles in OSs is important to the design of the OS as well as security.  
Now that a better appreciation and understanding of operating systems (specifically 
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Windows NT), threads, processes and security has been gained, Chapter III can focus on 
Windows CE threads and processes. 
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Processes are a vital part of program execution as discussed in Chapter II.  
Chapter II also described an operating system as a program.  Therefore, process 
management is a vital role of the operating system.  This chapter will focus on the 
processes and threads in the WinCE operating system. 
Windows CE is a multithreaded WIN32 system, with the same process and thread 
model and file formats as Windows NT (WINNT) [MUR98].  In both cases, the kernel 
supports multitasking; it has preemptive, priority-based scheduling [MUR98].  Windows 
CE has characteristics in common with WINNT.  Some of the complexities of the 
WINNT process model have been removed from Windows CE, but the “animated spirit” 
(model) has been left in tact. 
This chapter describes Windows CE’s “animated spirit,” processes, in more 
detail.  Processes and threads in the WINNT-based OS have been defined.  Their data 
structures have been discussed, and their life cycle has been examined.  However, 
because Windows CE is a smaller OS that operates in a smaller memory space, there are 
some differences between its processes and threads as compared to those of WINNT. 
B. WINDOWS CE 
 What is Windows CE and why is it important?  A white paper [MWS2a] from the   
Microsoft Corporation provides answers to the question.  It states: 
Microsoft Windows CE is an open, scalable, 32-bit operating system that 
is designed to meet the needs of a broad range of intelligent devices, from 
enterprise tools such as industrial controllers, communications hubs, and 
point-of-sale terminals to consumer products such as cameras, telephones, 
and home entertainment devices.  A typical Windows CE-based embedded 
system targets a specific use, runs disconnected from other computers, and 
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requires an operating system that has a small footprint and a built-in 
deterministic response to interrupts. 
Windows CE consists of a set of discrete modules and sub modules, or 
components, each of which provides full or partial support for major 
features of the operating system.  By selecting a minimum set of modules 
and components, a device manufacturer can design an operating system 
tailored to requirements of a particular device.  By controlling the size 
(“footprint”) of the operating system, original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) can design for speed and efficiency, while still providing the 
performance of 32-bit, preemptive multitasking, multithreaded system and 
the richest possible set of APIs for developing applications. [MWS2a] 
 Microsoft designed CE to compete in the embedded systems market [MUR98].  
Microsoft had a specific class of embedded devices in mind for CE.  Instead of being 
stand-alone devices, these devices are intended to be mobile companion devices that 
supplement the desktop and synchronize information with the desktop personal computer 
(PC) [MUR98].  Approaching the design of the CE operating system with the idea that it 
supports a companion device may explain why Windows CE’s processes and threads 
maintain the look and feel of the WINNT’s processes and threads. 
 Unlike Windows NT, Windows CE can only support up to 32 simultaneous 
processes [MIC98].  When WinCE initializes, it creates a single 4GB virtual address 
space; it divides that 4GB address space in half creating (2) 2GB spaces, and it further 
divides 1 of the 2GB address spaces into 33 equal slots ranging from 0 – 32.   When a 
process is initialized, WinCE selects an open slot in 1 of the allocated 33 slots [MIC98].  
Slot 0 is always reserved for the currently running process [MIC98]. 
 Windows CE does not assign processor time to processes, as does WINNT, 
instead Windows CE assigns processor time to threads.  In WinCE, threads are the unit of 
execution instead of processes, and are assigned execution quanta by the scheduler 
[MIC99].  This means that a process is terminated if its primary thread is terminated.  
Although it is the threads that are assigned quanta, it is the processes that reserve the 
resources necessary to enable users to open and work in several applications at the same 
time [MIC99]. 
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C. WINDOWS CE PROCESS 
Only 32 processes can execute simultaneously in WinCE, and, not all 32 slots are 
available to the user [MWS2b].  A minimum of four, and more typically seven or eight, 
processes are created when the system starts up.  These are system processes not directly 
accessible to users [MWS2c].  WinCE will usually utilize process slots for the following 
processes at system start up (system processes):  kernel (nk.exe), device drivers 
(device.exe), installable file systems (filesys.exe), and graphical user interface, GUI, 
(gwes.exe) [MWS2b].  WinCE process’s address space, 32MB, which accounts for the 
limited number of processes that WinCE can simultaneously execute, is 64 times smaller 
than the address space for processes in the desktop version of Windows, usually 2048MB 
[MWS2b]. 
The WinCE process data structure has the following fields:  a virtual address 
space, executable code, data, object handles, environment variables, base priority, and 
minimum and maximum working set sizes [MWS2d].  Processes are created by 
applications, or by the shell when a program is invoked by the user (such as double 
clicking a program icon) [GAR99].  Creating a process is done by calling 
CreateProcess() [GAR99].  CreateProcess() creates a new process and its primary 
thread; it is a function used to run a new program [MWS2e].  Figure 3.1 demonstrates 
how process creation is invoked. 
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Figure 3.1 CreateProcess Function (From: [GAR99]) 
1. Creating a Process 
Once the CreateProcess( ) function is executed, the new process executes the 
specified executable file [MWS2e].  The following parameters (which are not part of the 
Process_Information structure) are a part of the CreateProcess( ) function call [MWS2e]: 
 lpszImageName 
The lpszImageName parameter is a pointer to a null-terminated string that 
specifies the module to execute.  The string can specify the full path and filename of the 
module to execute or it can specify a partial path and filename if the program is in the 
current working directory.  The lpszImageName parameter must be non-NULL and must 
include the module name.  
lpszCmdLine 
The lpszCmdLine parameter is a pointer to a null-terminated string that specifies 
the command line to execute. The lpszCmdLine parameter can be NULL.  In that case, 
the function uses the string pointed to by lpszImageName as the command line.  
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If both lpszImageName and lpszCmdLine are non-NULL, * lpszImageName 
specifies the module to execute, and * lpszCmdLine specifies the command line, (note 
that * indicates pointer). C language runtime processes can use the argc and argv 
arguments.  If the filename does not contain an extension, .EXE is assumed.  If the 
filename ends in a period (.) with no extension, or the filename contains a path, .EXE is 
not appended.  Windows CE versions 2.10 and later search the directories indicated by 
the lpszImageName parameter, if the path of the file being looked for is not explicitly 
specified, in the following order:  
The windows (\windows) directory  
The root (\) directory of the device  
An OEM-dependent directory  
The OEM-defined shell (\ceshell) directory — this is available to Platform 
Builder users only  
lpsaProcess  
Not supported; set to NULL.  
This is a security attribute that determines how the new process will be shared.  It 
controls what another process may do if the other process opens a duplicate handle. 
lpsaThread  
Not supported; set to NULL.  
This is a security attribute that determines how the new thread will be shared.  It 
controls what another thread may do if the other thread has a duplicate handle. 
fInheritHandles 
Not supported; set to NULL.  
This is a Boolean value that determines whether or not the new process will 





The creation flags in the fdwCreate parameter govern the type and priority of the 
new process. The following creation flags can be specified in any combination, except as 
noted in Table 3.1:  
Value Description 
CREATE_DEFAULT_ERROR_MODE Not supported. 
CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE 
The new process has a new 
console, instead of inheriting 
the parent’s console. This flag 
cannot be used with the 
DETACHED_PROCESS flag.  
The console is a component of 
the command processor shell.  
On the IPaqs, the component 
used is explorer, a Handheld 
PC style shell. 
CREATE_NEW_PROCESS _GROUP Not supported. 
CREATE_SEPARATE_WOW_VDM Not supported. 
CREATE_SHARED_WOW_VDM Not supported. 
CREATE_SUSPENDED 
The primary thread of the 
new process is created in a 
suspended state, and does not 
run until the ResumeThread 
function is called. 
CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT Not supported. 
DEBUG_PROCESS If this flag is set, the calling 
process is treated as a 
36 
debugger, and the new process 
is a process being debugged. 
Child processes of the new 
process are also debugged. The 
system notifies the debugger of 
all debug events that occur in 
the process being debugged. 
DEBUG_PROCESS 
If you create a process with 
this flag set, only the calling 
thread (the thread that called 




If this flag is set, the calling 
process is treated as a 
debugger, and the new process 
is a process being debugged. 
No child processes of the new 
process are debugged. The 
system notifies the debugger of 
all debug events that occur in 
the process being debugged. 
DETACHED_ PROCESS Not supported. 
 
Table 3.1 Creation Flags for CE CreateProcess (From: [MWS2e]) 
Windows CE does not support the concept of priority classes for processes. The 





Not supported; set to NULL.  
Environment variable, generally used to help customize programs and usually 
kept where they (variables) are always available. 
lpszCurDir 
Not supported; set to NULL.  
Current directory setting 
lpsiStartInfo 
Not supported; set to NULL.  
This is a structure that the parent process must fill out before calling 
CreateProcess. 
lppiProcInfo 
The lppiProcInfo parameter is a pointer to a PROCESS_INFORMATION 
structure that receives identification information about the new process.  
This section, Section C, began by introducing the WinCE process, specifically the 
process’s requirements – virtual address space, executable code, data, object handles, 
environment variables, base priority, and minimum and maximum working set size.  This 
section also discussed the CreateProcess function, which detailed the necessary 
parameters for creating a process.  However, this section did not define the WinCE data 
structure, but, with the given information and knowing that the WinCE process and 
thread model is the same as for WINNT, it is conceivable that the data structures are 
similar.  By mapping the WinCE process requirements and WinCE CreateProcess 
function into the WINNT EPROCESS block (Figure 2.1), an approximation of the 
WinCE data structure is obtained, which is equivalent to Figure 2.1.  Table 3.2 and 3.3 





WinCE process requirements WINNT EPROCESS block 
Virtual address space Memory management info 
Executable code Process environment block 
Data Process environment block 
Object handles Handle table 
Environmental variables ???? 
Base priority Kernel process block 
Min & max working set size Memory  
 
Table 3.2 Mapping of Process Requirements to EPROCESS 
 
CreateProcess function parameters WINNT EPROCESS block 
LpszImageName ImageFileName 
LpszCmdLine ???? 
fdwCreate Process priority class not supported in CE
lppiProcInfo ???? 
 
Table 3.3 Mapping of CreateProcess Function Parameters to EPROCESS 
Windows CE operates in one of two modes (as mentioned earlier), user mode or 
kernel mode, and for the sake of performance, usually user mode is not invoked (so 
everything runs in kernel mode); so the areas that the CE data structure occupies may be 
different than that of the WINNT process data structure.  For instance, in the WINNT 
data structure, the KPROCESS and EPROCESS are both in kernel space.  It makes sense 
to separate the various parts of the process data structure for the WINNT process because 
some of its information and manipulations requires protection or privileged access.  Since 
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OEMs develop their software and applications to run in privileged mode, and since there 
is no separation of the address space within CE, there is no benefit for the various parts of 
the process to occupy different space based on their need for privileged access.  Indeed, 
the limited address space may not support such a design.  Remember each process is 
initially allocated 32MB of memory.  All other memory comes from a common pool that 
is shared by all processes, 2GB. 
Although the process’s data structure in CE is similar if not the same as that of 
WINNT, it does not support all the same functionality as the WINNT process.  This in 
itself is no great revelation given the smaller OS, but it does raise the question of 
extensibility.  Does this process data structure support the ability to be extended for 
future needs?  The answer to the question is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is one 
that needs to be considered.  The process data structure of CE appears to have been 
designed with the ability to handle applications that can run on the larger NT-based 
operating systems, but each application is subject to the memory constraints of CE. 
2. Terminating a Process 
Process termination is a subject usually overlooked or deemed insignificant in 
larger operating systems because the effect of one process not terminating properly, 
especially if it is not a critical process, can be relatively insignificant.  The process may 
hang or terminate in some non-desirable fashion, i.e. the user may see an exception 
message or a page fault message.  With the exception of a message, the termination of a 
process may not affect system performance (in larger operating systems) to any 
noticeable degree and usually will not affect the number of processes that a user can 
execute, at least from the average user’s perspective.  However, terminating a process in 
CE is important because, given only 32 slots available for processes, its direct effect on 
the number of processes that can be executed will be more noticeable to the user.  
Unlike the larger operating systems, CE cannot afford to have a process hang.  In 
CE, the impact of a hanging process on performance will be immediately apparent to the 
user.  Not only does a hanging process’s affect the number of processes that can run, and 
possibly the memory, but it also puts a drain on precious battery power.  Processes 
whether in larger NT-based operating systems or in CE have similar terminating 
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functions [MWS2f].  In WINNT a process can exist if its primary thread is terminated; 
however, in WinCE if a process’s primary thread is terminated, the process is 
automatically terminated.   
D. WINDOWS CE THREADS 
If the process of the Windows CE operating systems is equated with the “spirit” 
of the OS, the thread is the heart and soul of the OS.  It is the thread that gives life to the 
process.  Each process is started with a single thread, the primary thread, and the process 
can create additional threads from any of its threads [MWS2d].  The number of threads 
that can be created in a process is limited only by the amount of RAM available 
[MWS2h].  Each thread belonging to a particular process runs in the context of that 
process.  Also, all the threads of a process share its virtual address space [MWS2d].  A 
thread can execute any part of the process code to which it belongs, including parts 
currently being executed by another thread; and it is the thread that is allocated processor 
time (quantum) [MWS2g].   
Windows CE version 3.0 and higher offers 256 priority levels for threads 
[MWS2c].  The highest priority level is 0 and the lowest is 255.  Applications use levels 
255 through 248, which maps to the 8 priority levels available in earlier versions of 
Windows CE.  Real-time applications, drivers, and system processes use levels 247 
through 0.  Windows CE does not support process priority classes, which means 
theoretically that a process could hold a thread with the very highest level and a thread 
with the very lowest level [MWS2b/c].  A system scheduler determines which threads 
should run and when they should run.  A process starts when the scheduler gives 
execution control to one of its threads [MWS2c].  Threads with higher priorities run 
before threads with lower priorities, and threads that have the same priority run in a 
round-robin fashion.  The threads’ quantum has a default value of 25 milliseconds, which 
the OEM can set to a different value. 
Priority inversion, which occurs when a high priority thread is blocked from 
running because a lower priority thread owns a kernel object, is handled differently in 
WinCE than in other Windows operating systems [MWS2c].  Other Windows operating 
systems will raise all the low priority threads in the chain all at once, whereas CE will 
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raise each thread in the chain one at a time as necessary until the lower priority thread 
relinquishes the resource that the high priority thread needs.  WinCE guarantees the 
handling of priority inversion only to a depth of one level; for example, if thread 1 (a high 
priority thread) blocks waiting on a critical section held by thread 2 (a lower priority 
thread), thread 2 is raised to the same priority as thread 1.  However, if thread 3 is also in 
that chain, it will remain at its current priority level.  In other Windows operating 
systems, thread 3’s priority would also be raised. 
Threads in WinCE have a much greater role than those in other Windows 
operating systems.  The WinCE OS functionality is driven by threads and not processes.  
This does not necessarily mean that the data structure of the thread in WinCE needs to be 
different than that of WINNT.  But, it does change how the operating system functions.  
Thread creation is the same for both NT-based operating systems and WinCE.  Both 
operating systems use the CreateThread function.   
1. Creating a Thread 
The CreateThread function requires six parameters.  Two of the parameters are 
set to NULL, lpThreadAttributes and dwStackSize.   The parameter lpThreadAttribute is 
not supported by WinCe.  The parameter dwStackSize is automatically set.  The number 
of threads that can be created depends on the default stack size [MSW2i].  The default 
stack size for committed and reserve memory is specified in the executable file header 
[MWS2t].  A returned handle to a new thread indicates success and a NULL value 
indicates failure.  The CreateThread function is described below [MSW2i]: 
HANDLE CreateThread( 
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes, 
DWORD    dwStackSize, 
LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress, 
LPVOID    lpParameter, 
DWORD    dwCreationFlags, 
LPDWORD    lpThreadId ); 
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lpThreadAttributes  
Ignored. Must be NULL.  
This is a pointer to a structure that specifies a security descriptor for the new 
thread and determines whether child processes can inherit the returned handle. 
dwStackSize  
Ignored. The default stack size for a thread is determined by the linker setting 
/STACK.  
Specifies the initial commit size of the stack, in bytes. 
lpStartAddress  
Long pointer to the application-defined function of type 
LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE to be executed by the thread and represents the starting 
address of the thread, points to the start of the thread routine. 
lpParameter  
Long pointer to a single 32-bit parameter value passed to the thread.  
Specifies an application-defined value that is passed to the thread routine. 
dwCreationFlags  
Specifies flags that control the creation of the thread are shown in Table 3.4.  
Value Description 
CREATE_SUSPENDED The thread is created in a suspended state, and 
will not run until the ResumeThread function is 
called. 
0 The thread runs immediately after creation. 
 





This parameter is a long pointer to a 32-bit variable that receives the thread 
identifier.   If this parameter is NULL, the thread identifier is not returned. 
The CreateThread function describes the creation of a thread, but it should not be 
confused with the data structure of a thread.  Just as with the processes in WinCE, there is 
no evidence to indicate that the thread in WinCE has a different data structure than the 
threads in WINNT.  There are parameters, as shown in the function above, in the 
CreateThread function in WinCE that are not supported.  But, the non-supportability of 
those parameters does not impact the data structure.  The non-supportability impacts the 
user’s ability to control specific fields in the data structure.  Reference Figure 2.6 to recall 
the thread’s data structure in WINNT.   
2. Terminating a Thread 
Terminating a thread is as important as creating a thread.  As previously 
discussed, the proper functioning of the WinCE OS is linked to the proper functioning of 
its threads, not its processes.  Therefore, it is vital that the OS not only knows which 
thread to terminate, but also which thread termination function to use.  Terminating the 
wrong thread, for example the primary thread, prematurely could have undesirable 
consequences, such as terminating the process and any other threads associated with that 
process.  This would not only be an annoyance to the user, but it would render the OS 
unsuitable because the OS might randomly shut down programs thereby creating 
instability.  Some of these instabilities will be discussed below. 
The operating system must know which thread termination function to use when 
terminating a thread.  There are several functions that can be used when terminating a 
thread in WinCE [MWS2j].  If possible, the TerminateThread( ) function should be 
avoided; but if used, it must be used very carefully because it has dangerous side effects 
[MWS2j].  The side effects are as follows [MWS2j]: 
If the thread targeted for termination owns a critical section, the critical 
section will not be released. 
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If the thread targeted for termination is executing certain kernel32 calls 
when it is terminated, the kernel 32 state for the thread’s process could be 
inconsistent. 
If the targeted thread is manipulating the global state of a shared DLL, the 
state of the DLL could be destroyed, affecting other users of the DLL. 
[MWS2j] 
The side effects from the TerminateThread( ) function could possibly lead to an 
unstable operating system.  Therefore, programmers and designers must take special care 
when writing applications that run on WinCE, not only with normal user applications, but 
also with system applications.   
One such system application of concern is the authentication protocol.  An 
authentication protocol represents the first step in developing a security enhanced WinCE 
OS.  Talisker, which is the current version of WinCE in development, uses Kerberos as 
an authentication protocol.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Whether or not Kerberos is the best protocol to use in WinCE is a question this 
research will attempt to answer.  Chapter IV will discuss various authentication protocols.  
The authentication protocol must be able to work with Microsoft’s “.Net” (pronounced 
dot net) project, for obvious reasons.  Most importantly, the protocol must be small, 
correct and efficient.  As each protocol is discussed in Chapter IV, several questions must 
be asked: 
Will this protocol work well with threads? 
How many process slots does this protocol need to execute, including supporting 
processes? 
Once these questions have been answered, enhancing the security in WinCE will 
still be a challenge.  However, knowing how the operating system manages processes and 
threads, in particular how many process slots are available and that the threads are 
allocated process time instead of the processes is imperative to understand the system 




















A. AUTHENTICATION BACKGROUND 
Authentication provides evidence to one party (Bob) that another party (Alice) is 
who she says she is.  People are constantly authenticating in their day-to-day interaction 
with their surroundings.  People use a variety of means to authenticate one another as 
well as other objects.  People can be viewed as complex mechanisms that use a complex 
set of authentication protocols (senses) and rules to authenticate animate and inanimate 
objects.  This complex set of protocols and rules is not yet available to computers.  But, 
as technology continues to advance, computers may one day be able to use a similar set 
of complex protocols to authenticate various types of objects as well.  Until then, 
developers must use the most appropriate and most robust authentication protocol 
available. 
Examples of how different authentication protocols work best for different 
situations and environments can be observed in people’s daily authentication processes.  
In this example, Alice uses the most appropriate “sense” (authentication protocol) to 
verify whether or not Bob is who he claims to be.  If Alice is walking down the street and 
thinks she hears Bob’s voice calling her from a short distance saying, “Hey Alice it’s me 
Bob,” she might turn in the direction where the voice originated.  Upon turning, Alice 
immediately shifts to another protocol to verify whether or not it truly is Bob she hears 
calling her.   At this point, although Alice’s sense of hearing initially picked up on an 
object that sounded like Bob, her sense of hearing was not the most appropriate protocol 
in the given environment to authenticate Bob; Alice instead used her sense of sight to 
confirm whether or not the object was Bob.   
In a different environment, the protocol might change as well.  For example, if 
Bob calls Alice on the telephone, upon picking up the receiver and acknowledging a 
successful transmission connection, Alice immediately listens to the tone and inflection 
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of the voice emanating from the receiver.  Once Bob identifies himself, Alice uses her 
sense of hearing to decide whether or not she believes the person on the other end of the 
connection really is Bob.  Alice’s sense of hearing is no more reliable in this situation 
than in the previous situation, but it is more appropriate.  There may be times when Alice 
will use multiple protocols to authenticate an object; and there may be times when Alice 
is not equipped with the proper set of protocols to authenticate a given object.  However, 
in most situations, Alice can feel reasonably sure she can authenticate most objects in 
most environments; computers are not so lucky. 
Not every computer’s operating system will support every authentication 
protocol.  When multiple authentication protocols are supported by an OS (as is the case 
with Windows 2000 Server [BOS00]), the protocol to be used will be determined by both 
the client and server (based on protocols common to both) [SOL00].  Furthermore, it is 
assumed that having multiple authentication protocols not only adds complexity to the 
system, but it also requires more memory from the system.  Complexity and increased 
memory requirements are contrary to maintaining the smallest possible footprint for 
WinCE.  This chapter will discuss several authentication protocols supported in Talisker, 
and the Department of Defense’s Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
Talisker, the next generation WinCE operating system, presumably should 
provide more functionality than its predecessor.  One function that Talisker provides that 
its predecessor does not is support for Kerberos.  Kerberos is an authentication protocol 
used for mutual authentication between a client and server. [OWS3n]  Kerberos is also 
supported by Windows 2000 [MWS2v]. 
B. KERBEROS 
Conceptually, Kerberos is an authentication protocol based on tickets and session 
keys.  In a network scheme, in order for Alice to prove her identity to Bob, she first has to 
obtain a ticket from a centralized authority to present to Bob.  The centralized authority is 
known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC).  Domain controllers in Windows 2000 
implement the KDC. [MWS2v]  Windows 2000 is mentioned and used to keep the 
example simple.   
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Each domain contains a Kerberos authority, which a user (client) of that domain 
must contact to receive a ticket from the KDC.  If Alice and Bob are in the same domain, 
they share the same Kerberos authority.  In the case where Alice shares the same domain 
as Bob, Alice can go directly to her local KDC and get a ticket for Bob.  To get a ticket 
for Bob, Alice must prove her identity to the KDC by proving knowledge of her 
password or private key (in the case of smart card logon).  [MWS2v] 
The ticket that Alice gets contains a lot of information, which includes Alice’s 
name, and a randomly generated encryption key (session key).  The KDC locks this 
information in the ticket by encrypting it with a master key generated from Bob’s 
password that only Bob and the KDC share.  Once Alice presents the ticket to Bob, Bob 
can verify that the contents really came from the KDC by successfully decrypting the 
ticket.  In this scheme the idea is that Bob will decrypt the ticket, look at the client’s 
name, and realize that whoever sent the ticket to him must really be Alice because the 
KDC validated her identity before giving her the ticket.  [MWS2v] 
The reader should note in the previous example, Bob really has no idea who sent 
him the ticket.  Although understanding the ticket process in Kerberos is fairly straight 
forward, there is another step included in the process to ensure that a bad guy is not 
simply replaying a recorded version of the ticket and masquerading as Alice.  This 
additional step requires Alice to send the ticket and prove that she is the owner of the 
ticket.  This is accomplished through the use of the session key. [MWS2v] 
Alice must prove to Bob that she knows the session key that the KDC gave to 
both Bob and her.  Alice proves to Bob she knows the session key by sending him a little 
package called an authenticator along with the ticket.  The authenticator is Alice’s name 
plus the time on her clock, encrypted with the session key.  If Bob can decrypt this 
authenticator, the name inside matches the client’s name inside the ticket, and the 




Figure 4.1 Kerberos Protocol Process (After: [STA99]) 
Figure 4.1 depicts Alice’s request to talk to Bob.  In this example Alice and Bob 
belongs to the same realm (domain).  When Alice logs onto her workstation and requests 
to talk to Bob the following process occurs: [KAU95, STA99] 
1. Alice logs on to her workstation and requests a ticket-granting 
ticket. 
2. Authentication server verifies Alice’s access right in the 
database, creates a ticket-granting ticket and session key.  The 
results are encrypted using Alice’s password and sent back to 
Alice.   
3. Alice sends the KDC (depicted as Kerberos in Figure 1) the 
ticket she received, Bob’s name, and an authenticator, which 
consists of the time of day encrypted with the session key. 
4. The ticket-granting server decrypts the ticket and authenticator, 
verifies the request, then if the request is valid, the KDC constructs 
a new key, for use in communication between Bob and Alice, and 
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the KDC also constructs a new ticket, which consists of the newly 
generated key, Alice’s name, and an expiration time.  The new 
ticket is encrypted with Bob’s master key.  The newly encrypted 
ticket, Bob’s name, and the session key are encrypted with Alice’s 
master key and sent back to Alice. 
5. Alice decrypts the information and sends a request to Bob.  The 
request consists of the ticket, which Alice received that is 
encrypted with Bob’s master key (session key and Alice’s name) 
and an authenticator (time and session key).   
6. Bob decrypts the session key and discovers Alice’s name and a 
session key.  Bob decrypts the authenticator and sees that the party 
to which he will communicate does indeed know the session key; 
he also checks the time in the authenticator to ensure it is close to 
the current time (a step taken to mitigate replay attacks).  Bob 
sends messages to Alice. 
For more information on Kerberos, the reader can reference [MWS2v] as a 
starting point.  As mentioned earlier, the Kerberos protocol requires the client to present a 
valid and correct password or private key to the server in order to receive a ticket.  Most 
readers are familiar with passwords, but they may not be as familiar with private keys.  
Private keys are often associated with a PKI, which will be discussed in Section D.  
Talisker does not provide any documentation stating that it supports a PKI, but it does 
support a component that PKIs can support as well: smart cards [OWS3n]. 
C. SMART CARDS 
Smart cards are credit card size devices with a crypto-capable microprocessor 
[OWS3o].  A layer of security can be added to WinCE by using smart cards as a 
mechanism to store authentication information or to enable digital signing.  The WinCE 
smart card subsystem supports CrytoAPI through smart card service providers (SCSPs), 
which are dlls (defined in Chapter V, Section D, subsection 6) that enable access to 
specific services.  The subsystem provides an interface between the smart card reader 
hardware and the applications.  Windows CE does not provide SCSPs as part of the 
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operating system code that is shipped to the OEMs.  Smart card vendors must provide the 
appropriate SCSPs.  Windows CE does provide the interfaces shown in Table 4.1. 
Subsystem component File Description 
Resource manager Scard.dll Uses the Win32 APIs to manage 
access to multiple readers and 
smart cards 
Resource manager helper library Winscard.dll Exposes PC/SC services for using 
smart cards and smart card readers. 
Smart card reader helper library Smclib.lib Provides common smart card 
driver support routines and 
additional T=01 and T=1 protocol 
support to specific drivers as 
needed 
Sample smart card reader drivers Pscr.dll 
bulltlp3.dll 
stcusb.dll 
SwapSmart PC reader driver. 
Serial reader driver. 
Universal serial bus (USB) reader 
driver. 
 
Table 4.1 Windows CE Smart Card Interfaces (From: [MWS2w]) 
Typically, a smart card system consists of applications, a subsystem that handles 
communication between smart card readers and the applications, readers (hardware not 
included with WinCE subsystem), and the smart card.  Figure 4.1 illustrates this 
relationship and process flow: [MWS2w] 
                                                 
1 T=x is a type of data manipulation language table, see [MWS2y]. 
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Figure 4.2 Windows CE-based Smart Card System Architecture (From: [MWS2w]) 
In this section, the WinCE smart card subsystem was briefly discussed but also of 
note is a Microsoft press release in June 2000.  This press release allows the reader to 
understand that smart cards and smart card technology has begun its proliferation in both 
the business and government communities as indicated by the following quote from the 
article. [OWS3p] 
 The General Services Administration (GSA) is an example of a forward-
looking organization working to deploy smart cards to the federal 
government.  GSA recently awarded a 10-year contract estimated at $1.5 
billion to five industry partners….Microsoft is the subcontractor of each of 
these prime awardees. 
Smart cards used as a component in the PKI architecture are used as mechanisms 
that store a user’s private key.  The smart card allows the user to access the network 
and/or possibly services on the network.  The smart card provides a means of identifying 
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the user to the network and authenticating the user.  The Department of Defense (DoD) 
plans to use smart cards as part of their PKI [DOD01]. 
D. DOD PUBLIC KEY INFRUSTRUCTURE (PKI) 
The Department of Defense’s PKI is an asymmetric cryptography key system, 
which means it uses two different keys to encrypt and decrypt information [DOD01].  
The reader should note this key system is different from Kerberos, mentioned earlier, 
which uses a symmetric key system for its session key service.  In PKI, the keys are 
complementary [DOD01].  Public Key Infrastructure has in addition to the asymmetric 
key other components that enable it to provide the following IA services.   
• Authentication: ensures senders are who they claim to be 
• Confidentiality: ensures data remains private 
• Integrity: ensures data has not been modified 
• Non-repudiation: ensures person sending cannot deny participation 
The components that the PKI is built upon to provide the services mentioned 
above are as follows: [DOD01] 
• Certificate Policy: this is a policy that establishes the common security rules 
for a given assurance class under which certificates are generated and 
managed to maintain trust within a PKI. 
• Public Key Certificates: this is the cornerstone of the PKI technology; it is 
the ability to distribute public keys to large populations while maintaining the 
trust that each certificate is associated with the identity, public and private 
keys of the claimed subscriber. 
• Token: this is a mechanism used to hold certificates and private keys. 
• Subscriber: the customers of the products and services provided by a PKI. 
• Registration: the process that subscribers use to identify themselves to the 
PKI and request certificates. 
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• Certificate Management: this is the generation, production, distribution, 
control, tracking, revocation, and destruction of public/private keys and 
associated certificates. 
To understand exactly how PKI works, the reader can reference [DOD01].  This 
work will provide a very brief overview to give the reader a basic understanding.  In a 
PKI a subscriber can log onto a PK-enabled computer with his or her private key, which 
could be stored on a smart card or 3.5” floppy disk or some other medium.  The 
subscriber will have access to the computer and any services provided by the PKI in 
accordance with his or her authorizations.  The subscriber’s authorization is based on his 
or her private key, which identifies the person. 
During the system’s authentication process, the subscriber’s identity is verified 
along with the services that the subscriber can access.  Along with providing the system 
with the subscriber’s private key, the subscriber should be required to enter a password or 
fingerprint or some other type of identifying information, to mitigate the possible loss or 
theft of the subscriber’s private key.  This analysis will not discuss the underlying 
mechanisms that make a PKI work. Here it is sufficient to describe how some of the PKI 
components can be supported by WinCE. 
As mentioned earlier, WinCE, Talisker, has a certificate database.  Talisker also 
has various certificates preloaded as with most Microsoft browsers to support companies 
such as Verisign and others.  Talisker supports smart cards through its CAC subsystem.  
The aforementioned functionality in Talisker may make it possible to modify WinCE to 
support PKI without overhauling the code.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Authentication is one facet of system security.  Thus, it enhances the security of 
the operating system.  In deciding which authentication protocol to use, developers must 
chose one robust enough to allow maximum participation with current and future 
technologies (as well as can be anticipated).  Talisker provides a robust authentication 
protocol (Kerberos), and it also supports two key components of a DoD’s PKI: 
certificates and smart cards.  Talisker may prove to be a bridging device between current 
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A. MOORE’S LAW 
In 1965, Gordon Moore, eventual cofounder of the Intel Corp., predicted that the 
density of transistors in an integrated circuit would double every year.  Moore’s 
prediction was later changed to reflect an 18-month cycle.  His prediction became known 
as Moore’s law. [OWS3e]  Not only has his law proven to be accurate over the years, but 
it has also described the trends of microprocessor performance [OWS3e].   Today, in 
some areas, technology is advancing at an even faster rate than Moore’s law 
hypothesized.  For example, according to Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, director of the 
National Security Agency (NSA), NSA is losing the race to keep up with technology; the 
development cycle of the global industry (telecommunications) is moving at the “speed 
of light” [OWS3f].  
1. Computing at the Speed of Light (Optical or Photonic Computing) 
Technology may not evolve literally at the speed of light (186,171 miles per 
second), but the analogy puts in perspective the pace at which technology is changing.  
One such change that is being researched, although real world uses may be years away, is 
the slowing down of light [OWS3g].  A Danish physicist, Lene Vestergaard, has 
developed a way to slow light down to 38 miles per hour [OWS3g].  Controlling the 
speed of light presents many possibilities.   
One such possibility is the development of extremely fast computers based 
on optical switches that would open and close under the control of very 
weak laser beams.  Computer systems could then use optically switched 
logic gates instead of today’s electronic logic gates. [OWS3g] 
If this innovation can be realized, the power of the desktop could conceivably be 
in the palm of our hands. 
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2. Computing on the Atomic Scale (Quantum Computing) 
Another processing technology that, if realized, will revolutionize computing is 
quantum computing.  Quantum computing is based on the quantum theory, which arose 
at the beginning of the 20th century to explain certain phenomena that could not be 
modeled using classical mechanics.  Quantum computing is based on the idea of using 
quantum bits, called qubits, that can represent ones, zeros, or both at the same time 
(superposition), which is different from electronic circuits in today’s computer that can 
represent only ones and zeros [OWS3h].  The increased number of data states in quantum 
computing will increase the computation power of computers, and the superposition of 
qubits will enable computers to apply the same operation to many numbers in parallel in 
one step [OWS3h].  Quantum computing would allow computer scientist to overcome 
computational complexity hurdles and would permit a variety of here-to-fore 
“impossible” computations. 
B. TOMORROW (THE FUTURE) 
It is difficult to estimate what will emerge, but much of the research in the areas 
of computing power seems to indicate that palm-sized devices will have a role in 
ushering in our future (whether PDAs are transitional hardware or “the future” remains to 
be seen).  From DNA computing to chaotic computing and everything in between 
(photonic computing, and quantum computing), the focus is on making computers 
smaller, faster, and more powerful.  Conceptually, computers will be a part of everything 
from our appliances to our transportation.  In a PC Magazine Online article (Fast-
Forward to 2010) written by Carol Levin in January 1999, she interviewed two IBM 
visionaries, Paul Horn – director of IBM research, and Phil Hester – chief technology 
officer of IBM Personal Systems Group [OWS3i].  They envision a possible future as 
follows: 
Your refrigerator will know when you’re running low on milk and remind 
your hand-held device so you can pick up a quart on the way home.  At 
the grocery store, you’ll pick up a few items, toss them in a bag, and leave; 
radio-frequency tags on the items will charge your account automatically.  
Your car dealer will detect car problems remotely and correct them by 
downloading software repairs directly to your car over an Internet 
connection.  A portable, miniaturized storage device will store all the 
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information in the Library of Congress.  They went on to say that within 
the next 20 years, a holographic cube will offer storage for $1 per 
terabyte…and digital assistants (PDAs) will give you thoughtful advice. 
[OWS3i] 
To the observant reader, the future may appear more near than far.  As mentioned 
in Chapter II, PDAs are becoming more popular among professionals and consumers.  
The Pocket PCs (Casio, IPaqs and Jornada) are continually evolving to provide improved 
functionality, such as improved synching capabilities, multitasking, and processing power 
[OWS3j].  Pocket PCs also provides new software and expansion possibilities, which can 
be used for everything from memory cards to modems.  With smart appliances entering 
the market place and the proliferation of Internet connectivity for PDAs, the future may 
be as soon as tomorrow. 
Tomorrow is our future, but today’s technology is our bridge to that future.  If we 
believe the future will be similar to that of IBM’s visionaries, PDAs will have a 
significant role in that future.  Today PDAs don’t give us thoughtful advice, but they do 
provide scheduled reminders.  Our refrigerators are not notifying our PDAs to remind us 
to pick up milk, but our PDAs can remind us of our shopping list.  PDAs have a useful 
role in some people’s lives today, and it is a role that is not far removed from their 
predicted future role.  To achieve the envisioned future, there must be other technologies 
introduced to bridge the gap from where we are today to where we will be tomorrow.  
One of these is the Microsoft .NET effort. 
C. TODAY (.NET) 
Microsoft’s .NET (pronounced “dot net”) initiative has been described as an 
ambitious plan to build an operating system on the Internet itself [LEV01].  The .Net 
initiative is of interest because it may be a technology that will enable our automobile 
mechanics to detect problems with our cars, remotely, and notify us via email on our 
PDAs – a possible interim step to achieving the futuristic goal of having the mechanic 
repair certain problems by downloading software. 
By describing .Net as an operating system on the Internet, the reader should 
understand that each device that connects to the operating system (Internet) is treated as a 
potential process – review Chapter II.  (Also each device will have its own local 
59 
operating system such as Win20002, WinCE, WINNT, etc.  The Internet operating 
system mentioned is for the reader to understand the illusion created by .Net 
applications.)  Just as an operating system has to create a process, .Net has to “create a 
process” as well.  Once a person who is a subscriber to .Net logs onto a computer 
connected to the Internet, a process begins on that person’s behalf – consistent with the 
operations of an operating system.  A NewsWeek article states,  
Microsoft will (after the .Net initiative) transform its business model to 
focus on subscription-based services. [LEV01] 
  Conceivably, through this subscription process to .Net, consumers will interact 
with business applications as well as other Microsoft services.  
Each device that connects to the Internet and executes assemblies (a .NET 
component that will be explained later) is described as a potential process.  As explained 
in Chapter II, processes reserve resources to execute programs.  When a person logs onto 
a device, goes out to the Internet, and executes an assembly, the device becomes a 
process working on that user’s behalf.  The device reserves the resources needed for the 
program (assembly) to execute.  In the .NET framework all the resources needed to 
execute an assembly may not be contained in the assembly or on the local machine 
[MWS2k].  Therefore proper execution of the assembly may require additional resources, 
which may have to be retrieved within the .NET framework.  This may be transparent to 
the user, so, from the user’s perspective, .NET may appear to be an operating system. 
.NET is also described as a development platform.  One article describes .NET as 
an open language platform for enterprise and Web development [MEY01].  Although 
.NET may provide numerous benefits for both users and developers, it is the developers 
who will notice and benefit from the ASP.NET component of .NET [MEY01].  
ASP.NET maintains session state without storing client information on the server, and 
developers no longer have to use URL encoding or cookies [MEY01].  However, there 
are security implications (which will not be discussed) that developers must consider 
when deciding whether or not to use this capability.   
                                                 
2 Windows 2000, Windows NT 4.0, Windows 95, Windows Me, Windows 98, Windows 98 SE and 
Windows CE are trademarks of the Microsoft Corporation. 
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There may be differences of opinion over whether or not .NET is an operating 
system on the Internet or strictly a development technology, but that is more a matter of 
perspective than functionality.  Its functionality has characteristics of an operating system 
and of a development platform.  Microsoft characterizes .NET as  
a new platform for building integrated, service-oriented applications to 
meet the needs of today’s Internet business; applications that gather 
information from, and interact with, a wide variety of sources, regardless 
of the platforms or languages in use. [MWS2l]  
Microsoft’s description of .NET as “a new platform for building…” confirms that 
.NET is a development platform.  However, in the very same description, Microsoft 
describes .NET’s applications in terms of processes…“applications gather… a wide 
variety of sources.”  Chapter II described a process as an entity that reserved resources to 
enable a program to execute; in a similar sense, application must gather or reserve 
sources or resources to ensure proper execution.  As .NET is described in more detail 
(detailed overview), the application’s (assembly’s) comparison to a process should 
become more obvious. 
D. DETAILED OVERVIEW OF .NET 
The .NET structure, to include its internals and components, is more concrete.  
The .NET framework is much too vast to discuss in detail in one chapter, but an overview 
of the technology can be adequately explained.  At the heart of .NET is a desire to 
standardize and integrate proprietary information [MWS2l].  To fulfill the requirement of 
standardization, .NET has embraced the Extensible Markup Language (XML) standard 
for describing data [MWS2l].   
XML is a language for describing data elements.  It describes the 
attributes of the data and identifies its intended meaning and use. 
[MUR01] 
In addition to using a common standard, developers also need to use a common 
protocol; .NET will use Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [MWS2m]. 
Overall, .NET has six layers of structure [MEY01].  Figure 5.1 shows the six 
layers.  The top layer in the .NET structure is the Web Services layer.  The layer below 
Web Services is the Framework and Libraries layer followed by the Interchange and 
Development Environment layer, which has two separate components:  interchange 
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standards and development environment.  The next layer down is the Component Model 
layer followed by the Object Model layer.  The final or bottom layer is the Common 
Language Runtime layer [MEY01]. 
 
Figure 5.1 .NET Structure (From: [MEY01]) 
1. Web Services 
Web Services is designed to provide .NET users, persons and companies, with 
services for e-commerce and business-to-business applications [MEY01].  Microsoft’s 
.NET user interface promises to fulfill Berners-Lee’s (inventor of the Web) vision of the 
Web being a collaborative (i.e., multi-user read/write) environment [MWS2m].  A Web 
Service is a URL–addressable resource that programmatically returns information to 
clients [MWS2n].  Clients can use Web Services without worrying about the 
implementation details of those services [MWS2n]. 
The web services infrastructure is designed as follows:  a discovery mechanism to 
locate Web Services, a service description for defining how to use those services, and 
standard wire formats with which to communicate [MWS2o].  Figure 5.2 details the Web 
Services infrastructure.  The role of the Web Services directories, discovery, description 
and wire formats are as follows [MWS2o]: 
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Figure 5.2 Web Service Infrastructure (After: [MWS2o]) 
Web Services Directories provide a central location to locate Web 
Services provided by other organizations.  Web Services directories such 
as a Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) registry 
fulfills this role [MWS2o].  The XML schemas associated with UDDI 
define four types of information that would enable a developer to use a 
published Web Service: business information, service information, 
binding information, and information about specifications for services 
[MWS2p].  The Remoting Security3, a security mechanism in .NET, will 
provide the integrity checking service; for more on the remoting security 
mechanism see [MWS2k]. 
                                                 
3 A Microsoft Corporation term – this service provides support for remote objects invocation that can 
span AppDomains, processes, or machines [MWS2k]. 
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Web Services Discovery is the process of locating, or discovering one or 
more related documents that describe a particular Web Service using the 
Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [MWS2o].   
A published .disco file, which is an XML document that contains links to 
other resources that describe the Web Service, enables programmatic 
discovery of a Web Services. [MWS2q] 
A Web Service client may bypass the discovery process if the location of 
the service description is known [MWS2o].  When a Web Service is 
created for private use, there will not be a public means of finding it 
[MWS2q]. 
Web Service Clients must understand how to interact with a particular 
Web Service before they can use it [MWS2o].  Therefore it is necessary to 
provide a service description that defines what interactions the Web 
Service supports [MWS2o].  The service description is an XML document 
written in WSDL that defines the format of messages the Web Services 
understands [MWS2r]. 
Web Services Wire Formats enable universal communication by using 
open wire formats, which are protocols understandable by any system 
capable of supporting the most common Web standards.  SOAP, a simple 
lightweight XML–based protocol, is key for providing Web Service 
communication. [MWS2o] 
2. Frameworks and Libraries 
Microsoft’s .NET framework and libraries define a set of guidelines as a way to 
help class library designers more fully understand the trade-offs between different 
solutions [MWS2s].  This layer is intended to provide a well-defined managed class 
library with the following characteristics [MWS2s]: 
Consistent: Similar design patterns are implemented across libraries. 
Predictable: Functionality is easily discoverable.  There is typically only 
one way to perform a specific task. 
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Web Centric: Callable from semi-trusted code. 
Multilanguage:  Functionality is accessible to many different programming 
languages. 
.Net contains thousands of reusable components [MEY01].  Some of the most 
immediately attractive aspects for developers are ASP.NET, active server pages for 
developing smart Web sites and services; ADO.NET, an XML-based improvement to 
ActiveX Data Objects, for databases and object-relational processing; and Windows 
Forms for graphics [MEY01]. 
3. Interchange Standards/Development Environment 
The third layer from the top has two different components.  The interchange 
standard component is an XML-based standard that serves as a platform-independent 
means of exchanging objects [MEY01].  The most important are SOAP, an increasingly 
popular way to encode objects, and WSDL [MEY01].  The development environment 
provides a common software development environment offering facilities for 
development, compilation, browsing, and debugging shared by many languages 
[MEY01]. 
4. Component Model 
The fourth layer from the top of the platform’s structure is the component model.  
The component model for .NET is based on object-oriented ideas [MEY01].  In .NET, 
developers build assemblies, which consist of numerous classes with well-defined 
interfaces [MEY01].  Assemblies are Portable Executable (PE) files [MSW2l].  
Assemblies (managed PE files) are not x86 machine code or machine code targeted to 
any specific CPU platforms; assemblies are MicroSoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) 
code generated by language compilers that support .NET [MSW2l].  Each assembly 
contains metadata [MSW2l].   
Metadata is used to permit communication about the data to take place 
between programs that do not otherwise know about each other. [MUR01] 
The components of an assembly are described in a manifest. [MWS2l] 
A manifest is a block of data that enumerates the assembly's files, and 
controls what types and resources are exposed outside of the assembly.  
The manifest also governs how references to these types and resources are 
mapped onto the files that contain their declarations and implementations, 
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and enumerates other assemblies on which this one is dependent. The 
existence of a manifest provides a level of indirection between consumers 
of the assembly and the implementation details of the assembly and makes 
assemblies self-describing. [MWS2l] 
For the component model layer, this paper only mentions assemblies, manifests, 
and metadata.  The reader can find out more about the components of this layer by 
visiting the Microsoft development web site [MWS2x].  
5. Object Model 
This level provides the conceptual basis on which everything else rests, especially 
the object-oriented type system [MEY01].   
The formal specification of the type system implemented by the common 
language runtime is called the Common Type System (CTS).  The CTS 
specifies how object classes (called types) are defined. [MWS2l] 
The following is the list of possible members that a class type can contain 
[MWS2l]: 
Field: A data variable that is part of the object’s state.  Fields are 
identified by their name and type [MWS2l]. 
Method: A function that performs an operation on the object, usually 
changing the object’s state.  Methods have a name, signature, and 
modifiers.  The signature specifies the calling convention, number 
of parameters (and their sequence), the types of the parameters, 
and the type of value returned by the method.  The modifiers can 
include custom attributes, whether the method is public, private, 
static, and so on [MWS2l]. 
Property: To the caller, this member looks like a field.  But to the class 
implementor, this member looks like a method.  Properties allow 
an implementor to calculate a value only when necessary and allow 
a class user to have simplified syntax.  Properties also allow you to 
create read-only or write-only “fields” [MWS2l]. 
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Event: Events provide a notification mechanism between an object and 
other interested object.  For example, a button could offer an event 
that notifies other objects when the button is clicked [MWS2l]. 
The common language specification defines restrictions ensuring language 
operability [MEY01]. 
6. Common Language Runtime 
The common language runtime provides the basic set of mechanisms for 
executing .NET programs regardless of their language of origin: 
translation to machine code (judiciously incremental translation, or 
jitting), more commonly known as “just in time”, loading security 
mechanisms, memory management (including garbage collection), version 
control, and interfacing with non-.NET code. [MEY01] 
The .NET framework represents a new way of developing software by providing 
technologies (via the .NET common language runtime engine) that support rapid software 
development [MWS2l].  Some of the features provided by the .NET common language 
runtime engine are listed below [MWS2l]: 
Consistent programming model: All application services are offered via 
a common object-oriented programming model, unlike today where some 
OS facilities are accessed via DLL functions and other facilities are 
accessed via COM objects. 
Simplified programming model:  .NET seeks to greatly simplify the 
plumbing and arcane constructs required by Win32 and COM. 
Specifically, developers no longer need to gain an understanding of the 
registry, GUIDs, IUnknown, AddRef, Release, HRESULTS, and so on. It 
is important to note that .NET doesn't just abstract these concepts away 
from the developer; in the new .NET platform, these concepts simply do 
not exist at all. 
Run once, run always:  All developers are familiar with “DLL Hell,” but 
for those who are not, a dynamic link library (dll) is a collection of 
subroutines that can be loaded to support the execution of an application 
(application x).  When the code in these libraries are updated (new 
versions), the new dll (updated version) might no longer support the 
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execution of application x.  If a user downloads the new dll to support the 
execution of application y, the new dll, if it is an updated version of the 
old dll used to support application x, will over-write the old dll and the 
user will not be able to execute application x.  Since installing components 
for a new application can overwrite components of an old application, the 
old app can exhibit strange behavior or stop functioning altogether. The 
.NET architecture now separates application components so that an app 
always loads the components with which it was built and tested. If the 
application runs after installation, then the application should always run. 
This marks the end of DLL Hell. 
Execute on many platforms:  Today, there are many different flavors of 
Windows: Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows 98 SE, Windows Me, 
Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000 (with various service packs), Windows 
CE, and soon a 64-bit version of Windows 2000. Most of these systems 
run on x86 CPUs, but Windows CE and 64-bit Windows run on non-x86 
CPUs. Once written and built, a managed .NET application (that consists 
entirely of managed code) can execute on any platform that supports the 
.NET common language runtime. It is even possible that a version of the 
common language runtime could be built for platforms other than 
Windows in the future. Users will immediately appreciate the value of this 
broad execution model when they need to support multiple computing 
hardware configurations or operating systems. 
Language integration:  COM allows different programming languages to 
interoperate with one another. .NET allows languages to be integrated 
with one another. For example, it is possible to create a class in C++ that 
derives from a class implemented in Visual Basic. The .NET platform can 
enable this because it defines and provides a type system common to all 
.NET languages. The Microsoft Common Language Specification 
describes what compiler implementors must do in order for their 
languages to integrate well with other languages. Microsoft provides 
several compilers that produce code targeting the .NET common language 
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runtime: C++ with managed extensions, C# (pronounced "C sharp"), 
Visual Basic (which now subsumes VBScript and Visual Basic for 
Applications), and JScript®. In addition, companies other than Microsoft 
are producing compilers for languages that also target the .NET common 
language runtime.  
Code reuse:  Using the mechanisms just described, you can create your 
own classes that offer services to third-party applications. This, of course, 
makes it extremely simple to reuse code and broadens the market for 
component vendors. 
Automatic resource management:  Programming requires skill and 
discipline. This is especially true when it comes to managing resources 
such as files, memory, screen space, network connections, database 
resources, and so on. One of the most common bugs occurs when an 
application neglects to free one of these resources, causing that application 
or others to perform improperly at some unpredictable time. The .NET 
common language runtime automatically tracks resource usage, 
guaranteeing that an application never leaks resources (in other words, this 
ensures the proper management of resources so that a resource is freed 
only after an application has finished using it and not before, it also 
ensures the resource is released and made available for other applications 
once the original application has finished using it).  In fact, there is no way 
to explicitly free a resource.  
Type safety:  The .NET common language runtime can verify that all 
code is type safe. Type safety ensures that allocated objects are always 
accessed compatibility. Hence, if a method input parameter is declared as 
accepting a 4-byte value, the common language runtime will detect and 
trap attempts to access the parameter as an 8-byte value. Similarly, if an 
object occupies 10 bytes in memory, the application can't coerce this into a 
form that will allow more than 10 bytes to be read. Type safety also means 
that execution flow will only transfer to well-known locations (namely, 
method entry points).  
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Rich debugging support:  Because the .NET common language runtime 
is used for many languages, it is now much easier to implement portions 
of applications using the language that is best suited for it, the application. 
The .NET common language runtime fully supports debugging 
applications that cross language boundaries. The runtime also provides 
built-in stack-walking facilities, making it much easier to locate bugs and 
errors.  
Consistent error handling:  One of the most aggravating aspects of 
programming in Windows is the inconsistent ways errors are reported. 
Some functions return Win32 error codes, some return HRESULTS 
(which is a return value of COM functions and methods [MWS2u]), and 
some raise exceptions. In .NET, all errors are reported via exceptions. 
Exceptions allow the developer to isolate the error-handling code from the 
code required to get the work done. This greatly simplifies writing, 
reading, and maintaining code. In addition, exceptions work across 
module and language boundaries as well. 
Deployment:  Today, Windows-based applications can be incredibly 
difficult to install and deploy. There are usually several files, registry 
settings, and shortcuts that need to be created. In addition, completely 
uninstalling an application is nearly impossible. With Windows 2000, 
Microsoft introduced a new installation engine that helps with all of these 
issues, but it is still possible that a company authoring a Microsoft 
Installer Package may fail to do everything correctly. .NET seeks to make 
these issues ancient history. .NET components are not referenced in the 
registry. In fact, installing most .NET-based applications will require no 
more than copying the files to a directory, and uninstalling an application 
will be as easy as deleting those files. 
Security:  Traditional OS security provides isolation and access control 
based on user accounts. This has proven to be a useful model, but at its 
core it assumes that all code is equally trustworthy. This assumption was 
justified when all code was installed from physical media (such as CD-
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ROM) or trusted corporate servers. But with the increasing reliance on 
mobile code such as Web scripts, Internet application downloads, and e-
mail attachments, there is a need for more granular control of application 
behavior.  The .NET Code Access Security model will deliver the granular 
control [MWS2l].  For more on the .NET Code Access Security model see 
[MWS2k]. 
E. CONCLUSION 
.NET is more complex then what has been described in this chapter.  However, 
this chapter gives a fundlemental overview of what .Net is, what it is designed to do, and 
how it is designed.  The focus of this chapter has been on the .NET structure.  For more 
on .NET visit the Microsoft development web page [MWS2l].  Although .NET is being 
designed to work on any operating system, as of the writing of this paper, it only works 
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Pocket PC, which is the third generation of the WinCE operating system designed 
to run on small devices from embedded systems to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), is 
gaining popularity among professionals and is estimated to own 40% of the market share 
for palm-sized devices by 2004 [OWS3c].  Today, many people are using PDAs; and as 
PDA prices drop, additional users are anticipated in the near future.  The trend among 
professionals towards using Pocket PC instead of Palm, which is a competing operating 
system, seems to indicate a preference for functionality and familiarity. 
The familiarity of WinCE (for PDAs) is based on its applications, which are 
similar to those found on desktops executing Windows operating system.  The use of 
WinCE for embedded devices and PDAs should raise security concerns because of recent 
exploits against the Palm operating system [KIN01].  Although the exploits are not 
against WinCE, the exploits prove that these small-foot printed operating systems are 
vulnerable.  This vulnerability puts at risk information stored on PDAs as well as 
appliances running WinCE as an embedded OS. 
Mitigating these risks require security.  Security must be implemented to allow 
the operating system to continue to perform at a reasonable level (a subject for further 
research) while ensuring privacy of data and protection of the operating system itself to 
include the data, code, and mechanisms (dependencies) of the operating system.  Any 
success in enhancing the security of WinCE requires understanding the operating system 
through analysis of its code.  That analysis is facilitated through an understanding of the 
operating system itself. 
This portion of the project examined WinCE’s threads and processes data 
structures, creation, and termination.  This work also looked at the authentication 
mechanism in Talisker, the next generation of the WinCE operating system.  Talisker 
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supports Kerberos, an authentication protocol based on tickets, and session keys 
(symmetric keys).  Talisker also supports components of a PKI, which is a key 
management scheme based on asymmetric keys (public keys, private keys and 
certificates).  Public key infrastructure delivers authentication, integrity, confidentiality, 
and non-repudiation. 
PKI does not make an operating system more self-protecting.  A public key 
infrastructure provides a means for identifying an object (authentication), providing 
integrity and confidentiality of the data being transferred between objects, and ensuring 
that an object/subject cannot deny executing a transaction (non-repudiation).  Thus, PKI 
is a means for providing security to data.  However, authentication, which is used to 
identify an object/subject, does provide limited security to the operating system. 
Authentication can be used to insure that only authorized individuals gain access 
to the PDA.  By providing such a mechanism, for example, by requiring a user to provide 
a valid smart card with an authorized pass phrase bound to that particular smart card, and 
by having a valid certificate in the PDA’s certificate database before the system (PDA) 
will initialize, provides initial protection to the device.  This work also discussed future 
technologies that may affect WinCE.  Faster processors may make it possible to enhance 
security without degrading performance to unacceptable levels.  Personal Digital 
Assistants may be required to support new network technologies, such as .NET.  To 
avoid overlooking security requirements for these future technologies, developers must 
decide what support to implement and how to ensure security with the added 
functionality.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a few areas for future research.  In the WinCE operating system, the file 
system, the I/O system, the memory and cache management, etc., should be examined.  
Through code analysis it should be determined whether or not WinCE can be modified to 
fully support PKI without having to completely rewrite the operating system.  By 
supporting PKI, conceivably, Pocket PC could be integrated into an “unclassified but 
sensitive” network without degrading the network’s integrity.  This is theoretically based 
on using a combination of technologies currently supported by Talisker, smart cards and 
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the PDA’s unique identification.  Further research is required to prove whether or not this 
is possible.  
In this work, there were certain security attributes in the create process function 
that were not used: lpsaProcess and lpsaThread (Chapter III, Section C, Subsection 1).  
Several areas of further research that could prove fruitful include determining what these 
attributes would provide to the operating system in terms of security; and if these 
attributes provide additional security, how they can be supported without significant 
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